WHEN TOO MUCH ISN’T ENOUGH (Soft Censorship 2025)

We now know that 2025 was the last full year of the Fidesz regime. By the end of the year, change no longer seemed impossible, but few would have dared to bet on it. One reason for this was that the propaganda had been thundering throughout the year with such force that it seemed as though it would never fall silent. We now also know that on 12 April 2026, it did, after all, fall silent.

In 2025, with the “Crackdown law”, political attacks on free and independent journalism and on free and independent civil society reached a new level (Officially draft law on “transparency in public life”, Hungarian Parliament, Bill No. T/11923, 2025). It seemed as though the Sovereignty Protection Office, born a toothless tiger, was finally getting a set of teeth – a strong set of steel false teeth. It could hardly wait to finally take a proper bite. The “Crackdown law” would have deprived the organisations listed by the Sovereignty Protection Office of virtually all their domestic and foreign sources of income.

Then Pride – the largest civil expression of opinion ever seen in Hungary – made it clear that the threats were already backfiring. Loudly and spectacularly. Had Fidesz passed the “Crackdown law”, there would have been a good chance of further mass demonstrations involving hundreds of thousands of people. That is too high a political price to pay on the eve of an election campaign.

But the “Crackdown law” has shown what will happen if Orbán remains in power in 2026. Orbán has realised that a semi-autocracy will not be enough in a country that has otherwise been mismanaged to the point of dysfunction. It is not enough to ignore and stigmatise critical voices; they must also be driven out. Russia has come very close to everyday life in Hungary, whilst Europe has drifted further and further away.

And just when we thought Fidesz had nowhere left to expand in the traditional media markets, Indamedia (Index.hu) acquired Blikk and Ringier’s entire Hungarian portfolio. This was done despite the parties being fully aware that the European Media Freedom Act, which had since come into force, made all such acquisitions subject to prior scrutiny by the media regulator.

We might also interpret this to mean that, by 2025, Fidesz had realised there was a real chance of defeat. It bagged whatever it could and issued threats more vociferously than ever before. In contrast, however, interviews conducted on the night of 12 April 2026 with Fidesz’s second- and third-tier figures showed that they certainly had not reckoned with defeat. They believed their own propaganda and their own falsified opinion polls more than they believed the voters.

In the months leading up to the election, Fidesz dominated the public sphere just as it had before. Artificial intelligence appeared in its propaganda arsenal, generating not only war-mongering but also a fake election manifesto. Yet it had run out of things to say. Orbán staked everything on the 2026 election: there would be enough voters who believed that only Orbán was capable of defending the sovereignty of the Hungarian people against the evil machinations of Brussels and Kyiv.

In the end, there were far more people who had had enough of the lies, the fear-mongering and the propaganda.

By the very next day after the elections, the 16-year Orbán regime already began to seem a distant memory. Yet we must carry its lessons forward: civil oversight and civic courage are indispensable. That is why the end of the regime cannot mean the end of critical analysis of media policy. Even if we are confident that analyses of the Magyar government’s media policy will paint a very different, truly European
picture of the Hungarian media system and public sphere.

Full analysis: WHEN TOO MUCH ISN’T ENOUGH THE RISE AND FALL OF FIDESZ PROPAGANDA

 

The study was carried out in the framework of the HDMO (Hungarian Digital Media Observatory) project. Funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Health and Digital Executive Agency. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.