# NEWS ISLANDS IN A POLARISED MEDIA SYSTEM







#### **MERTEK BOOKLETS**

Volume 30

2023. JUN

Authors: ENDRE HANN KLÁRA MEGYERI ÁGNES URBÁN KATA HORVÁTH PETRA SZÁVAI GÁBOR POLYÁK

NEWS ISLANDS IN A POLARISED MEDIA SYSTEM



#### **MÉRTÉK MEDIA MONITOR**

If you have any questions, do not hesitate to contact us:

info@mertek.eu www.mertek.eu

#### Published by

Mérték Médiaelemző Műhely Közhasznú Nonprofit Kft. [Mertek Media Monitor Nonprofit Ltd.] H-1042 Budapest, Árpád út 90-92.

### Responsible for the publication Ágnes Urbán, managing director

#### **Responsible editor** Ágnes Urbán

The editing of the report was finished at Jun of 2023.



ISSN: 2559-8937 ISBN: 978-615-6406-10-1

# CONTETNT

Introduction	5
Methodology	6
Political interest and the sources of information	6
The role of individual news sources	
in political information	9
Assessments of the political balance	
and independence of Hungarian mediae	13
The credibility of the media	17
Consciousness in media consumption	20
Conclusions	22
Appendix	24
Political interest and the sources of information	24
The role of individual news sources in political information	29
Assessments of the political balance and independence of Hungarian media	42
The credibility of the media	49
Consciousness in media consumption	53



This study was drafted as part of the <u>Hungarian Digital Media Observatory</u> (<u>HDMO</u>) project. In the framework of the 30-month project, the researchers of Political Capital and Mérték Media Monitor studied the spread of disinformation and the efficacy of the measures taken against it; the journalists of the French news agency AFP and the Hungarian online news site Lakmusz performed fact-checking; the staff of the Idea Foundation held trainings about conscious media <u>consumption</u>; while Epresspack provided the digital infrastructure for the HDMO. Just as the project's first phase, the second phase was also co-financed by the European Commission. The members of the HDMO's consortium, which enjoys full independence in all of its activities, were selected in an <u>open competition by the European Commission</u>.



Funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or European Health and Digital Executive Agency. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.



# INTRODUCTION

here are many discussions nowadays about Hungarian citizens' access to diverse and quality news, as well as about the changes in the patterns of political information. There is broad agreement that the way public discourse works impacts political and social processes, but there are many doubts as to what news sources consumers rely on and how they assess them. The present study sought to survey news consumption patterns and how these change in a period of rapid transformation.

In cooperation with the Medián Public Opinion and Market Research Institute, Mérték Media Monitor has been surveying news consumption and public information patterns since 2014 (the results of the previous surveys are available at mertek.eu under 'Freedom of the Press'). A decade ago, the scope of the eventual transformation, how radically consumption patterns in the Hungarian media market would change, had been unforeseeable. Our series of surveys clearly show how marginal the role of the print newspaper market has become. Television, too, has lost its previous significance while digital news consumption has become dominant.

It is precisely on account of the changes in the observed consumption patterns that we have dedicated more space than previously to digital media. There are, of course, individual news sources that our survey still does not include separately because of the vast number of media in the digital space – it would be extremely challenging for a survey questionnaire to fully capture the fragmentation of media audiences. Nevertheless, it presents a solid overall picture and provides factual evidence concerning several phenomena we previously could only speculate about.

Like the previous surveys, this study also shows that the respondents' partisan preferences substantially influence what news sources they opt for. Government party voters prefer pro-government news sources, while opposition voters tend to consume independent media. However, it also emerged that despite widespread assumptions that these are completely insulated bubbles, that is not in fact the case; there is some overlap between the news consumption patterns of government party and opposition voters.

In addition to describing news consumption patterns, this year's survey also focused on finding out how consumers view the various media outlets in terms of their political orientation and credibility. On the one hand, this question captured the polarisation of Hungarian society, while at the same time it also shone a light on some previously unrecognised trends.

We looked deeper than previously at how conscious consumers are about their news consumption. The study sought to gauge how deliberately users try to resist the allure of algorithms and to what extent they assert their own preferences in consuming news contents.

The successive surveys carried out by Mérték and Medián aptly document the changes in Hungarian news consumption patterns amidst the rapid transformations of the Hungarian media system and the technological environment. The present study provides substantial help in understanding how news consumers inform themselves and what their general attitudes are.

# Methodology

The most recent data collection in the research series occurred between the  $14^{th}$  and the  $28^{th}$  of March 2023, when telephone interviews were conducted on a national sample of 1,200 persons representing Hungary's adult population. Slight differences between the sample and the population overall were adjusted for using a mathematical method called weighting. Thus, the respondents in the sample reflect the overall composition of the voting-age population based on the type of municipality they reside in, gender, age and educational attainment. The margin of error in the total sample is a maximum of  $\pm 3,5\%$ , depending on the distribution of answers.


In the survey, we labelled as opposition voters any respondent with a partisan preference who would not vote for either Fidesz-KDNP or Our Homeland (Mi Hazánk) if parliamentary elections were held this Sunday. In addition to the parties that were part of the alliance in the 2020 national elections, we also included in this category the supporters of the Two-Tailed Dog Party, the Everybody's Hungary Movement and the People's Party Movement.


### Political interest and the sources of information

The level of interest in politics was rather intense, with nearly two-thirds of respondents saying they are "very" or "somewhat" interested in politics. This is a massive increase over 2020, especially since the 2020 figures had already marked a discernible increase over the previously measured levels. At the time, we attributed the increase to the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. However, once the pandemic subsided, the level of public interest in politics did not abate and from the perspective of democratic public discourse in Hungary, this is a positive development.


This interest is also directly manifest in the time media consumers spend informing themselves about politics and public affairs. This time has increased visibly over the years (Figure 1). Compared to the surveys conducted in the 2010s, we have seen a sharp increase in the proportion of respondents who either said they spend a lot of time or more time than previously on consuming news. As is apparent, the most significant surge occurred between 2018 and 2020. This may be explained by the fact that during the pandemic it was absolutely vital for everyone to stay on top of the most recent developments (quarantine rules, school closure, the health situation, etc.). However, it was somewhat surprising to observe that the unusually high figures that emerged at the time did not subsequently drop back to the previous levels. In fact, by 2023 they had risen even further. One explanation may be that those who got used to regularly informing themselves during the pandemic found this useful or interesting, so they did not abandon the newfound habit. An alternative explanation may be that even though the pandemic is over, many events are still going on that influence people's everyday lives (the war next door, increased energy prices, high inflation, etc.). Undeniably, the first years of the 2020s were chockful with events, which could explain the increased demand for news/public affairs contents.

Figure 1
Change in time devoted to news consumption






# Compared to a few years ago\* how much time do you spend on informing yourself about politics/public affairs? (percent)



<sup>\*</sup>In 2014/15: "Compared to five years ago..."

As far as the sources of information that news consumers rely on are concerned, we found spectacular changes in the consumption patterns, especially the breakthrough of digital media and the decline of television. Seventy percent of respondents said they regularly rely on digital media for information, while only 49% said the same about television. As recently as the 2010s, television had been unequivocally dominant. The dramatic decline in the role of television is especially striking because our series of surveys only captures the trend of the past decade; it is evident that the print press had massively lost ground even before that. Only 29% of respondents said they often use radio as a source of political information, while in the case of print dailies and weeklies, this ratio barely reached 10% (Figure 2).

Figure 2
Change in sources of information by share of frequent users (percent)



The role of individual types of news sources in the political information of citizens is also reflected in the respondents' answers to the question concerning the type of media they would opt for if they had to choose a single media outlet to follow (Figure 3). The answers not only reflect everyday media consumption but also reveal which media the respondents would miss the most if they no longer had access to it for some reason. Once again, the preeminent role of television and the internet is apparent: 49% opted for some type of television channel (commercial, public service, or news channel), while a total of 45% selected an internet-based news outlet (a news site or some social media platform). In an interesting contrast, even though Figure 2 shows clearly that consumers are most likely to use the internet for information, the aforementioned numbers indicate that the public's attachment to television still looms large.


It is hardly surprising that we found significant differences between the various demographic segments when it comes to this question. The attachment to television was especially pronounced among the elderly and those with lower educational attainment, while youths and highly educated respondents found the internet essential.

There are also interesting differences if we look at the responses of groups with different political preferences. Government party voters are most likely to insist on watching the state television channels (30%), followed by a dead heat between commercial television and news channels (19% each). In this segment, online news sites only came in fourth, with 18% of government party voters picking this option if they had to choose a single news source. The preferences of opposition voters were completely different. Forty-five percent would stick with online news sites, all other alternatives lagged far behind. Especially striking was that only 2% of respondents who support the opposition mentioned state television in this context. These results highlight the peculiar structure of the Hungarian media situation, to wit the fact that the influence of the ruling party is very pronounced in legacy media (print, radio and television), while independent news sources, which also present narratives that diverge from that proffered by the government, are most likely to be online media.

Figure 3

The types of political/public affairs media preferred by the public

If for some reason you could only follow one type of media in the future,
which would you choose? (percent)




# The role of individual news sources in political information

To better understand Hungarian public discourse, one of the obvious questions to examine is how people inform themselves. To capture this, we looked at those who inform themselves from a given news source at least once a week. Of course, comparing the consumption of different types of media is subject to inherent limitations because the way people consume print weeklies tends to be very different from how they use online news sites, where the news is updated by the minute. Nevertheless, gauging which news source respondents check at least once a week provides a reasonably reliable picture of the weight of various outlets in the public's media consumption.

Although the television channel RTL clearly stands out, every news source in the Top 20 list reaches a significant audience. We found that television channels and online news sites dominate the top of the field, while radio stations start cropping up in the bottom half of the list; no print publication made it into the Top 20. This meshes with our finding above concerning the preeminent role of television and the internet in political information.


Figure 4

Top 20 news sources (percentage of people who consume the news source at least weekly)



As far as the role of television is concerned, Figure 5 shows that both major commercial television channels and public service television have lost some ground. Interestingly, the role of smaller television channels that focus on political content did not diminish – in fact, it has even increased in recent years. Thus, the gap between minor and major players has narrowed in the television market.


Figure 5
Information about politics/public affairs from television (trends, percent)



<sup>\*</sup>In 2014-15 the question was only related to M1, M2

As far as online news sites are concerned, they have visibly expanded their role in recent years, mainly owing to their outstanding results in 2020 and 2023. Origo was the only major player that failed to enhance its role in news consumption, but this is hardly surprising because in 2014 a significant portion of Origo's newsroom quit, and a short while later, the political influence over the site also became manifest at the ownership level. Given that Origo has been disseminating propaganda for years now, its stable position in the information of the broader public is indeed remarkable.


Figure 6
Information about politics/public affairs from online news portals (trends, percent)



One of the new elements in this year's survey was that we also asked about the consumption of political YouTube channels and podcasts (Figure 7). This confronted us with methodological difficulties because such contents are published on a wide variety of platforms and often more irregularly than on traditional media outlets. Nevertheless, we wanted a better picture of the role that these content producers play in informing the public. It was no surprise that the online television channel Partizán clinched the top spot in this category, with 10% of the public indicating that they watch it regularly and a further 19% saying that they watch it occasionally. Other content providers also reached a significant number of consumers, and it is apparent that many of those who follow public affairs tend to rely on these channels as a source of information. It seems safe to assert that the role of such contents in media consumption will appreciate further in the coming years.

Figure 7
The role of online talk programmes in political/public affairs news (percent)

### Do you watch or listen and how often?




# Assessments of the political balance and independence of Hungarian media

1

As we observed in previous years, respondents tended to have a negative view of the media system overall. A mere quarter of respondents felt they could get an accurate picture of the realities from the Hungarian media. Correspondingly, 75% of respondents said that the Hungarian press is biased and that the opinion of one side receives a greater emphasis than that of the other. Looking at the series of Mérték-Medián surveys, the negative trendline is clear, as the proportion of respondents who said they could adequately inform themselves by following the Hungarian media has declined continuously. At the same time, compared to our 2020 survey, there has been basically no change.

Figure 8
Objectivity of media

There are those who say that (1) one can inform oneself properly from the Hungarian media, that one can learn what the actual reality is by consulting these media; others (2) hold that the Hungarian press is biased and that the views of one side will always be featured more prominently than those of the other side. Which of these two views hews closer to your own? (Percentage of respondents who responded substantively)






Further specifying the question concerning political influence to get a more detailed picture, it became clear that, on the whole, respondents thought that Fidesz is more influential: an overwhelming majority, 88%, agreed with this. This high ratio owes to the fact that a consensus of sorts has emerged on this question, with even 76% of Fidesz voters acknowledging that the governing party has a great influence over the media. Opposition voters were almost unanimous (98%) in this assessment. There were no discernible differences between respondents by age. Despite frequent comments by government party politicians claiming that the forceful intervention by the government is a reaction to what they call a "left-liberal" dominance in the media, which they allegedly try to balance, at this point a clear majority of respondents are obviously aware that the government side has considerably greater influence over the media.

Figure 9
Political influence on the media
In your opinion, which political side or party wields a greater influence in the Hungarian media?
Percentage of respondents who responded substantively (N=1138)








The survey also sought to capture what respondents think about the efforts to influence the media and the direct interference with editorial decisions and contents (Figure 10). The results are somewhat surprising. Twenty-one percent of the public believe it is acceptable or somewhat acceptable for political actors to interfere with newspaper contents (4% "fully" agree and 17% agree "somewhat"). Only half of all respondents said that this practice is fully unacceptable, which indicates that only one out of two citizens regard one of the cornerstones of press freedom as an important value. It was also striking that even among opposition voters, some said they could fully or partially accept the intervention of political players in editorial contents (2% and 14%, respectively).

Figure 10
The perception of direct political intervention

Do you think it is acceptable for political actors to directly interfere in the content of a newspaper, for example by compelling the editors to publish outside content that the newsroom has no control over or by stopping articles from? (percent)






The survey suggests that the public has a rather realistic image of the presence of political influence in Hungarian media: 63% of respondents said that it is very typical and a further 31% assessed that political interference occurs frequently; by contrast, only 1% said that it never happens. On this question, the impact of political polarisation was especially pronounced, with an overwhelming majority of opposition voters (82%) saying it is very typical, while only half as many government party voters (41%) agreed with this assessment. It is noteworthy that respondents with higher education diplomas were far more likely (77%) to say that political influence on the media is "very typical" than respondents with lower levels of educational attainment (47%).

Figure 11
Presence of direct political influence in Hungarian media

# In your opinion, how typical is such direct political influence in the media in Hungary today? (percent)




# The credibility of the media

1


As part of our survey, we also asked respondents about the credibility of some media brands that are considered especially important. The data show clearly that the top half of the list tends to feature media brands that are widely considered to be independent, while the bottom half includes the media brands that are generally perceived as being pro-government.

Figure 12
Assessment of the credibility of news sources
grades on a scale of 5: percent; averages on a scale from 0-100



Partisan preferences substantially influence the average credibility values, which is a good illustration of the massive polarisation of Hungarian society. Government party and opposition voters, respectively, have starkly different perspectives of media brands: what one camp considers credible is seen by the other side as having low credibility and vice versa. It is often said about Hungarian public life that the voters of the two major political camps live in completely distinct universes, and this is readily apparent in the relevant figures. Although in many respects Hungarians of different political persuasions harbour vastly different understandings of reality, interestingly that is not because they are all completely insulated in their own media bubbles or have no insight into the news that those on the other side of the political spectrum consume.

Figure 13
Perceived credibility of news sources by party preference averages on a scale from 0-100




One of the most surprising results of our survey is presented in Figure 14. The previous 2020 survey already showed that the bubble effect is far less pronounced than many assume. It is not true that the majority of media consumers consume exclusively either pro-government or independent news sources. In reality, news consumption is far more varied, and the majority of media consumers come across news that does not match the narratives that align with their own political preferences.

Until now, we had implicitly assumed that everyone only consults news sources that they consider credible: it did not seem rational that anyone would consume news sources they regard as unreliable. Nevertheless, the refutation of the filter bubble hypothesis, as well as our everyday impressions, suggested that this fundamental assumption may be mistaken and that hence it is worthwhile to ask respondents whether they follow news sources that they do not consider credible. Although we expected this behaviour to be present to some extent, we did not believe that as many as 41% of respondents would report that they do so. Furthermore, this is not limited to a distinct segment of society. On the whole, there was no massive political tilt among the respondents who said they consult media they do not see as credible (47% of opposition voters said they do this, while 40% of pro-government voters said the same). It appears that the consumption of news sources deemed as having low credibility is typical of every segment of society.

Figure 14
Consumption of news sources considered unreliable

Do you choose to read, watch or listen to a news source that you do not consider credible, which in your opinion often reports untruthfully? (percent)



# Consciousness in media consumption

1


Public debates stress increasingly often how exposed consumers are to the algorithms used by digital platforms, which raises questions concerning the extent to which users are or can remain conscious about their news consumption. In legacy media, it was up to the consumers' decision what contents they read, listened to or watched. In digital media, and especially in social media, algorithms decide what contents are presented to the consumer. Many consumers are unaware of how much this shapes their media consumption.

We also asked internet users (N=1,026) how they use the internet to inform themselves. Only 22% of these respondents said that they deliberately seek out public affairs contents. Another segment was very conscious about their internet use with respect to public affairs contents, but in a diametrically opposed fashion to the previously mentioned group; they expressly try to avoid such contents. Presumably, these users primarily look for entertainment on the internet. The biggest group, making up 64% of respondents, are those who do not specifically look for public affairs contents on the internet but if they see something that interests them, they click on it. In other words, roughly two-thirds of media consumers inform themselves about public affairs without any deliberate approach. In the various segments of the public we examined, the only demographic indicator that had a clear impact on the approach towards conscious information was educational attainment: 70% of those with no more than eight years of elementary education use the internet haphazardly as a source of political information, while among those with completed higher education the share of those who do the same was only 59%.

It is striking that the differences between those who are conscious about their news consumption and those who deliberately avoid political information are more pronounced. A deliberate approach towards consuming public affairs contents was more characteristic on average of those with higher education (38%), Budapest residents (33%), men (28%) and opposition voters (27%).

Figure 15
How people find politics/public affairs on the internet as a percentage of internet users (N=1026)


- deliberately seeks out political content
- does not specifically look for political content, but if they finds something interesting, clicks on it
- deliberately avoids political content, uses the internet for other purposes



We also tried to capture the impact of algorithms using another question, namely how often respondents click on political contents proffered by Google, Facebook, or other providers. At 19%, the share of those doing this daily was relatively high, while 35% said they do so at least once a week. In other words, on the whole, more than half of all respondents regularly consume contents offered by the major digital platforms. Only 23% of respondents said they never consume such information, but in their case, such a behaviour may be either motivated by a desire to avoid public affairs contents altogether or a high awareness of avoiding contents selected by algorithms specifically.

Figure 16


How often do you click on articles or videos suggested by Google, Facebook or other providers when it comes to political content (percent)



We also examined the issue of conscious media use by looking at the willingness to pay for media contents. In so doing, we were guided by the assumption that if someone pays for contents, they will certainly also use it. The possible payment structures available in the digital realm today are highly varied, and our question did not distinguish between donations for media and subscriptions; we merely wanted to know which media respondents were willing to spend money on. Eleven percent of respondents said they pay in some form for contents. Most likely because of their historical embeddedness and the force of longstanding habits, county newspaper subscriptions were still most widespread. A quarter of those who pay for contents said they subscribe to one of the county newspapers. Several projects launched in recent years (and in some instances even earlier) that have sought to emphasise the role of donations or subscriptions also did very well in this regard (Partizán, Telex, HVG, Klubrádió, 444, Magyar Hang).

The relatively high share of respondents who are willing to pay for contents is an encouraging sign, but at the same time, a growing number of independent media products compete for the money that consumers are willing to spend on media contents. Among those who are willing to spend money in this area, 78% only pay for a single product (it is likely that a significant portion of county newspaper subscribers falls into this category). Among those who spend money on media contents, only 19% said they pay for two media products and a mere 3% said they pay for three or more

Figure 17
What news sources do you subscribe to or support financially?
percentage of those who subscribe to or support a news source, percentage (N=132)



### **Conclusions**

In many respects, the 2023 news consumption survey has reaffirmed previously observed trends. Today, it is readily apparent that the public's information patterns changed extensively in 2020, and the impact captured at the time proved lasting, it was not limited to the time of the pandemic.

News consumption and public affairs information have unequivocally shifted towards digital news sources. Not only do online news sites and social media play a major role in this area, but the impact of content producers who offer their contents on various digital platforms was also discernible. At the same time, we saw a decline in the role of television, and just as in previous years, the role of print media and radio in news consumption remained low.

Another insight that meshed with the results of earlier surveys was that respondents tend to harbour a rather negative view of the state of Hungarian media overall; in fact, this has deteriorated further since we asked about this most recently in the 2020 survey. In every demographic segment we looked at, including government party voters, a significant majority agreed that Fidesz has the greatest influence on Hungarian public discourse. Those who assessed that the opposition has more influence or that the Hungarian media is roughly balanced were clearly in the minority.

One regrettable trend is that political influence on the media has essentially become accepted in Hungary. Even though working free of government interference is a fundamental precondition of a well-functioning media system, only half of all respondents agreed that direct political intervention in the work of newsrooms is fully unacceptable.

The perceptions of the credibility of individual news sources clearly illustrate the deep polarisation of Hungarian society. The news sources considered credible by one political side appear to be seen as entirely unreliable by the other side. Overall, the television channel RTL emerged as the most credible news source, but one indication of the deep polarisation was that the average credibility figures of the entire field converged around midrange values.

Up to now, there have been no surveys to show how likely media consumers are to consume news sources they deem unreliable. Hence, it was surprising to find that 41% indicated consuming news sources they do not trust. Although the respondents offered many individual motivations for doing so, further research is needed to better understand this particular consumption pattern.

The question of conscious media use was especially relevant in the context of online news consumption. Fewer than a quarter of those who use the internet said they deliberately seek out public affairs contents, while the majority said they tend to click on contents presented to them by the algorithms when those seem interesting. The willingness to pay was another good indicator to assess a respondent's conscious media use. The situation in this respect was mixed, featuring both good and bad news: it was good to see that even in the current economic situation, some are willing to pay for public affairs contents, and not only out of habit (which seems characteristic of many county newspaper subscribers) given that various independent initiatives launched in recent years have also been successful with a segment of media consumers.

On the whole, in many respects, the study has reaffirmed the previous results, and the general trends in the changing patterns of news consumption are clear. We have also more accurately captured some phenomena that previously we could only speculate about; now we have solid data to support the underlying assumptions. The survey provides a vital overview of news consumption patterns in Hungary, and the database that emerged in the process could serve as the basis for further in-depth research on the subject.

# **Appendix**

# Political interest and the sources of information

Figure 18
How interested are you in politics? (percent)




Figure 19
When you inform yourself about politics/public affairs, what news sources do you consult? (percent)




Figure 20
When you inform yourself about politics/public affairs, what news sources do you consult? (age groups, percent)





Figure 21
Change in time devoted to news consumption

How much time do you spend on informing yourself about politics/public affairs? (percent)



Compared to a few years ago\* how much time do you spend on informing yourself about politics/public affairs? (percent)



<sup>\*</sup>In 2014/15: "Compared to five years ago..."

Figure 22
Change in sources of information by share of frequent users (percent)





Figure 23
The share of those who don't inform themselves by party preference and political interest (percent)



<sup>\*</sup>Among the opposition party supporters, we do not include the voters of the Our Homeland Movement (Mi Hazánk Mozgalom).

Figure 24
The share of those who don't inform themselves by age (percent)





Figure 25
If for some reason you could only follow one type of media in the future, which would you choose? (percent)



<sup>\*</sup> Facebook is on the list from 2020 onwards.

Figure 26
The types of political/public affairs media preferred by the public

If for some reason you could only follow one type of media in the future,
which would you choose? (percent)






Figure 27
Top 20 news sources (percentage of people who consume the news source at least weekly)




Figure 43
Fókuszcsoport: Do you watch or listen and how often? (percent)




Figure 44
Megafon influencers: Do you watch or listen and how often? (percent)






Figure 30
Information about politics/public affairs from county daily newspapers (percent)
Percentage living outside Budapest and Pest county (N=842)




Figure 31
Information about politics/public affairs from television (percent)





Figure 32
Information about politics/public affairs from television (trends, percent)



<sup>\*</sup>In 2014-15 the question was only related to M1, M2

Figure 33
Information about politics/public affairs from television by party preference (share of those, who watch at least once a week)




Figure 34 Information about politics/public affairs from radio (percent)





Figure 35
Information about politics/public affairs from radio (trends, percent)



<sup>\*</sup>Until 2020 Kossuth Rádió and Petőfi Rádió were asked together

Figure 36
Information about politics/public affairs from weekly newspapers (percent)




Figure 37
Information about politics/public affairs from online news portals (percent)




Figure 38 Information about politics/public affairs from online news portals (trends, percent)




Figure 39
The role of online talk programmes in political/public affairs news (percent)

### Do you watch or listen and how often?




Figure 40
Partizán: Do you watch or listen and how often? (percent)




Figure 41
Friderikusz Podcast: Do you watch or listen and how often? (percent)




Figure 42
Pottyondy Edina: Do you watch or listen and how often? (percent)




Figure 43
Fókuszcsoport: Do you watch or listen and how often? (percent)




Figure 44
Megafon influencers: Do you watch or listen and how often? (percent)





Figure 45
Zshowtime: Do you watch or listen and how often? (percent)



84 88


89

Figure 46
Ultrahang: Do you watch or listen and how often? (percent)

other town 2 8

village 3 7

county seat/city with county rights 1



2

2

1

Figure 47
Do you use any social media like Facebook, Instagram, Tiktok?
As a percentage of internet users (N=1026)





Figure 48
How often do you come across articles or content on these social media sites about politics/public affairs? \*

As a percentage of social media users (N=870)



<sup>\*</sup>In 2018 and 2020: How often do you come across articles or content on Facebook about politics/public affairs?

Figure 49
How disturbed are you by this political content on social media?
Percentage of people who encounter political content on social media,




Figure 50
How disturbed are you by this political content on social media?
Percentage of people who encounter political content on social media, averages on a scale of 1 to 5 (N=867)





Figure 51
How often do you get your information from foreign news sources,
TV, radio, internet or print newspapers? (percent)



# Assessments of the political balance and independence of Hungarian media

Figure 52
Objectivity of media

There are those who say that (1) one can inform oneself properly from the Hungarian media, that one can learn what the actual reality is by consulting these media; others (2) hold that the Hungarian press is biased and that the views of one side will always be featured more prominently than those of the other side. Which of these two views hews closer to your own? (Percentage of respondents who responded substantively)




Figure 53
Objectivity of media

There are those who say that (1) one can inform oneself properly from the Hungarian media, that one can learn what the actual reality is by consulting these media; others (2) hold that the Hungarian press is biased and that the views of one side will always be featured more prominently than those of the other side. Which of these two views hews closer to your own? (percent)





Figure 54
Political influence on the media

# In your opinion, which political side or party wields a greater influence in the Hungarian media?

Percentage of respondents who responded substantively



<sup>\*</sup>response options in 2016: Fidesznek; the left; neither, the media are balanced

Figure 55
Political influence on the media

## In your opinion, which political side or party wields a greater influence in the Hungarian media?

Percentage of respondents who responded substantively (N=1138)




Figure 56
Opinions on the independence of news sources (percent)



- there are major media and news sources in Hungary that are completely independent, not under the direct influence of any political party or actor, or
- do you think that all major news sources are under the political influence of one side or the other?




Figure 57
Opinions on the independence of news sources (percent)

- there are major media and news sources in Hungary that are completely independent, not under the direct influence of any political party or actor, or
- do you think that all major news sources are under the political influence of one side or the other?






Figure 58

Do you think it is acceptable for political actors to directly interfere in the content of a newspaper, for example by compelling the editors to publish outside content that the newsroom has no control over or by stopping articles from? (percent)




Figure 59
The perception of direct political intervention

Do you think it is acceptable for political actors to directly interfere in the content of a newspaper, for example by compelling the editors to publish outside content that the newsroom has no control over or by stopping articles from? (percent)




Figure 60
In your opinion, how typical is such direct political influence in the media in Hungary today? (percent)




Figure 61
Presence of direct political influence in Hungarian media

In your opinion, how typical is such direct political influence in the media in Hungary today? (percent)




Figure 62
Which political side do you think this is more typical of?
Percentage of those who think that direct political influence occurs



in pro-government media in government-critical media in both of them in none of them DK/NA

2023 41 6 47 3 2

Figure 63
Which political side do you think this is more typical of?
Percentage of those who think that direct political influence occurs (N=1135)





Figure 64
The political placement of various news sources by the respondents (percent)



### The credibility of the media

1

Figure 65
Perceived credibility of news sources
grades on a scale of 5: percent; averages on a scale from 0-100




Figure 66
Perceived credibility of news sources
2018-2023, averages on a scale from 0-100




Figure 67
Perceived credibility of news sources by party preference averages on a scale from 0-100




Figure 68
Consumption of news sources considered unreliable

Do you choose to read, watch or listen to a news source that you do not consider credible, which in your opinion often reports untruthfully? (percent)




Figure 69
Why do use news sources that are not considered credible?
Percentage of those who use them (N=487)




Figure 70
Why do use news sources that are not considered credible? – party preference
Percentage of those who use them





Figure 71
Has a political news source that you consider credible ever been found to have deliberately lied, or has this never happened? (percent)





### Consciousness in media consumption

Figure 72
Are there any news sources, press products, radio stations or online portals to which you subscribe or which you support financially? (percent)





Figure 73
What news sources do you subscribe to or support financially?
percentage of those who subscribe to or support a news source, percentage (N=132)



#### Figure 74

#### How people find politics/public affairs on the internet

as a percentage of internet users (N=1026)

- deliberately seeks out political content
- does not specifically look for political content, but if they finds something interesting, clicks on it
- deliberately avoids political content, uses the internet for other purposes




Figure 75
When you read a political/public affairs article on social media, do you check the original source of the article?

percentage of social media users (N=870)




Figure 76
When you read a political/public affairs article on social media, do you check the original source of the article?
percentage of social media users (N=870)




Figure 77
How often do you look for information on sites that collect articles from different news sources, such as Startlap, Hírstart, or Hírkereső? as a percentage of Internet users(N=1026)




Figure 78
How often do you click on articles or videos suggested by Google, Facebook or other providers when it comes to political content (percent)




Figure 79
Which opinion is closer to you concerning content choice? (percent)






Figure 80
How much do you agree with the opinion that in the world of media lies are acceptable to a certain extent for the greater purpose?

percent, grades on a scale of 5



